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“Taking a Consenting Part” 
The Lost Mode of Participation 
KEVIN JON HELLER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario, which is based on the 
Hadžihasanović case1 at the ICTY: 
A high-ranking military officer overhears a group of soldiers dis-
cussing their intention to torture and execute civilians during an up-
coming military operation. The officer has been informed that he 
will assume formal command over the soldiers’ unit in a couple of 
months, but as of now they are not his subordinates and he has no 
power over them. He considers speaking to their commanding of-
ficer, the man he is replacing, but ultimately decides that rocking the 
boat simply isn’t worth it. True to their word, the soldiers commit 
unspeakable atrocities during the operation. 
Under modern international criminal law, the incoming command-
er’s silence was morally reprehensible but not criminal. He did not per-
sonally commit the atrocities. He did not order, solicit, or induce them. 
He did not aid and abet them. Because the soldiers were not under his 
effective control, either de facto or de jure, at the time of the crimes, he 
had no duty as a commander to punish or prevent them.2 
 Now make the commander an SS-Standartenführer, the soldiers 
SS-Schütze, and the generic civilians Jews; put the Standartenführer on 
trial before a Nuremberg Military Tribunal (“NMT”)—inter-Allied spe-
 
*  Professor of Criminal Law, SOAS, University of London. 
 1. See generally Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility (Jul. 16, 
2003).  
 2. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28 ¶ 1(a), Jul. 17, 1998, 
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (“A military commander or person effectively acting as a military com-
mander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed 
by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the 
case may be.”).  
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cial tribunals3 created by the United States pursuant to Control Council 
Law No. 10,4 enacted by the Allied Control Council on 20 December 
1945.5 The outcome will now be completely different: the Standart-
enführer will almost certainly be convicted for “taking a consenting 
part” in the soldiers’ crimes. Here is article II(2) of that Law: 
  Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in 
which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in 
paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an ac-
cessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted 
the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected 
with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a 
member of any organization or group connected with the commis-
sion of any such crime or (f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a) if he 
held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) posi-
tion in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or 
held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any 
such country.6 
Article II(2) resembles Article 25 of the Rome Statute. The prima-
ry difference—apart from membership in a criminal organization and 
the “high-position” provision, the latter of which the NMTs uniformly 
refused to use7—is subparagraph (c), which deemed an individual re-
sponsible for an international crime if he “took a consenting part there-
in.” That mode of participation is unique to the NMT. No modern tribu-
nal has ever convicted a defendant, military or civilian, of taking a 
consenting part (“TCP”) in an international crime. Indeed, TCP has 
been mentioned only once post-Nuremberg, at the ICTY: in Čelebići, 
the prosecution cited the Hostage case for the proposition that a superi-
or’s ability to exert “substantial influence” over someone who was nei-
ther a de jure nor a de facto subordinate was sufficient to establish 
command responsibility.8 Both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals 
 
 3. See generally KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). 
 4. See Control Council Law No. 10, art. III(1)(a), reprinted in TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 251–52 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1949) (“Each Occupying 
Authority, within its zone of occupation. . . shall have the right to cause persons within such Zone 
suspected of having committed a crime, including those charged with crime by one of the United 
Nations, to be arrested and shall take under control the property, real and personal, owned or con-
trolled by the said persons, pending decisions as to its eventual disposition.”).  
 5. See HELLER, supra note 3, at 12–17.  
 6. Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 4, at art. II(2) (emphasis added). 
 7. HELLER, supra note 3, at 251. 
 8. Prosecutor v. Čelebići, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 647 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (“The Trial Chamber is unable to agree with the submission 
HELLER MACRO FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/17  6:32 PM 
2017] The Lost Mode of Participation 249 
Chamber rejected that argument, insisting—correctly—that effective 
control was the minimum required by customary international law.9 
This article, which is divided into three sections, critically exam-
ines “taking a consenting part” as a mode of participation in an interna-
tional crime. Section I briefly explains how the NMTs understood the 
basic principles of individual criminal responsibility. Section II notes 
that the tribunals were divided concerning the legal nature of TCP and 
then presents the essential elements of TCP as a sui generis omission-
based mode of participation. Finally, using Hadžihasanović as a case 
study, Section III asks whether international criminal law would be bet-
ter off if it rediscovered TCP. 
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In his book The Nuremberg Trials, August von Knieriem—I.G. 
Farben’s general counsel and one of the ten defendants acquitted in the 
Farben case—noted that reading the NMT judgments with regard to in-
dividual responsibility is an exercise in frustration: 
[M]ost of the Nuremberg Tribunals did not even take the trouble to 
state clearly on which of the alternatives enumerated in [Article 
II(2)] their sentences were based in a particular case. Frequently it is 
impossible to ascertain whether a sentence is based on the fact that 
somebody was a principal or an accessory, or whether he was re-
garded as having participated in the crime only by consenting . . .  In 
most of the cases where more than one person acted, the opinions 
say no more than that a certain defendant “took part in the act.” It is 
then left to the reader to ponder which of the various alternatives of 
CCL No. 10 may have been applicable.10 
The Medical case is an excellent example of von Knieriem’s point. 
In convicting Karl Brandt, Hitler’s personal physician, for his role in the 
Nazis’ barbaric medical experiments, Tribunal I made no attempt to 
identify the specific mode(s) of participation on which it had relied. It 
simply held—unhelpfully—that he “was responsible for, aided and 
abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with plans and en-
terprises involving medical experiments conducted on non-German na-
 
of the Prosecution that a chain of command is not a necessary requirement in the exercise of supe-
rior authority.”). 
 9. Prosecutor v. Čelebići, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 266 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) (holding that “substantial influence as a means of con-
trol in any sense which falls short of the possession of effective control over subordinates, which 
requires the possession of material abilities to prevent subordinate offences or to punish subordi-
nate offenders, lacks sufficient support in State practice and judicial decisions”). 
 10. AUGUST VON KNIERIEM, THE NUREMBURG TRIALS 211 (Henry Regnery Co. 1959). 
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tionals against their consent, and in other atrocities.”11 
Despite the lack of precision in many of the judgments, however, it 
is clear that the NMTs generally adopted a consistent approach to indi-
vidual criminal responsibility. According to all of the tribunals, such re-
sponsibility consisted of three basic elements: (1) the commission of a 
crime specified in the indictment; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the 
crime; and (3) the defendant’s participation in the crime in a manner 
proscribed by Article II(2).12 In Farben, for example, Tribunal VI began 
by establishing the corporation’s involvement in plundering private 
property in occupied territory and then held: 
As the action of Farben in proceeding to acquire permanently prop-
erty interests in the manner generally outlined is in violation of the 
Hague Regulations, any individual who knowingly participated in 
any such act of plunder or spoliation with the degree of connection 
outlined in Article II, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10, is 
criminally responsible therefore.13 
What it meant to “knowingly participate” in a crime differed, of 
course, depending on the mode of participation in question. Two con-
siderations nevertheless applied to all of the modes. To begin with, the 
tribunals uniformly insisted that the requisite knowledge could not be 
inferred from the defendant’s official position. The Pohl tribunal, for 
example, noted “the necessity of guarding against assuming criminality, 
or even culpable responsibility, solely from the official titles which the 
several defendants held.”14 Similarly, the Krupp tribunal specifically 
held that “guilt must be personal. The mere fact without more that a de-
fendant was a member of the Krupp Directorate or an official of the 
firm is not sufficient.”15 
The tribunals also agreed that the participation requirement could 
 
 11. United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 198 (U.S. Gov’t 
Printing Office Oct. 1946–Apr. 1949).   
 12. United States v. Altstötter (The Justice Case), III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1093 (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office 1951). 
 13. United States v. Krauch. (The I.G. Farben Case), VIII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 
1141 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1952). 
 14. United States v. Pohl, V TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 980 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Of-
fice 1950). 
 15. United States v. von Bohlen und Halbach (The Krupp Case), in IX TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 
NO. 10, at 1448 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1950). 
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be satisfied by either an act or an omission. Tribunal V’s statement in 
the Hostage case is typical: “[i]n determining the guilt or innocence of 
these defendants, we shall require proof of a causative, overt act or 
omission from which a guilty intent can be inferred before a verdict of 
guilty will be pronounced.”16 The tribunals emphasized, however, that 
an omission was “not sufficient to warrant a conviction except in those 
instances where an affirmative duty exists to prevent or object to a 
course of action.”17 Liability for omission was thus limited in practice to 
taking a consenting part in a crime and command responsibility. 
III. TAKING A CONSENTING PART 
“Taking a consenting part” in a crime was first mentioned in the 
Moscow Declaration, which promised punishment for Nazis who “have 
been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in . . . atrocities, 
massacres and executions.”18 It also appeared in Article 3(b) of JCS 
1023/10, the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1945 to 
authorize military trials in the American zone of occupation, as well as 
in the Preamble to the London Agreement.19 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently considered TCP to be func-
tionally equivalent to command responsibility. A 21 October 1944 draft 
of JCS 1023/10 provided that the category specifically included “per-
sons who have taken a consenting part in war crimes” and gave the ex-
ample of “a superior officer who has failed to take action to prevent a 
war crime when he had knowledge of its contemplated commission and 
was in a position to prevent it.”20 None of the NMTs, however, followed 
the JCS. On the contrary, they either viewed TCP as another way to de-
scribe participating in a criminal enterprise or considered it a sui generis 
mode of participation in a crime similar to, but broader than, command 
responsibility. 
The critical difference between the two positions was whether TCP 
required a positive act or could be satisfied by an omission. The Pohl 
 
 16. United States v. List (The Hostage Case), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1261 (1950). 
 17. United States of America v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Cases), XIV TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10, at 625 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office Oct. 1946–Apr. 1949). 
 18. Joint Four-Nation Declaration, THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE, October 1943, reprinted in 
S. COM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, A DECADE OF AMERICAN POLICY, 1941–1949, at 834 (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office 1950).   
 19. London Agreement of Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
 20. Draft Directive on the Identification and Apprehension of Persons Suspected of War 
Crimes or Other Offenses and Trial of Certain Offenders, reprinted in TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 
247 (Appendix C). 
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tribunal took the former position, holding that “[t]here is an element of 
positive conduct implicit in the word ‘consent.’ Certainly, as used in the 
ordinance, it means something more than ‘not dissenting.’”21 The re-
quirement of a positive act then determined which defendants Tribunal 
II convicted for taking a consenting part in a crime. For example, Leo 
Volk, Head of the Legal Section in the Executive Office of the 
WVHA’s Division W, was convicted of mistreating concentration-camp 
inmates even though he had not personally committed the mistreatment 
and “did not have the power” to prevent it. The judges held that “[i]f 
Volk was part of an organization actively engaged in crimes against 
humanity, was aware of those crimes and yet voluntarily remained a 
part of that organization, lending his own professional efforts to the 
continuance and furtherance of those crimes, he is responsible under the 
law.”22 By contrast, the judges acquitted Josef Vogt, Chief of Office IV 
of the WVHA’s Division A, of taking a consenting part in similar 
crimes. In their view, “[t]he only consent claimed arises from imputed 
knowledge—nothing more,” while “[t]here is an element of positive 
conduct implicit in the word ‘consent.’”23 
Unlike the Pohl tribunal, the Einsatzgruppen, Farben, and Minis-
tries tribunals specifically viewed TCP as an omission-based mode of 
participation. In their view, a defendant took consenting part in a crime 
if three requirements were satisfied: (1) he knew that a crime had been 
or was going to be committed; (2) because of his authority, he was in a 
position to object to the criminal activity; and (3) he nevertheless failed 
to object to it. Thus understood, TCP was sui generis—a mode of par-
ticipation similar to, but broader than, command responsibility. 
A. Knowledge 
To begin with, the NMTs emphasized that a defendant accused of 
TCP must have known that a crime had been or was going to be com-
mitted. The Einsatzgruppen tribunal, for example, noted that Waldemar 
von Radetzky, a Deputy Chief in Einsatzgruppe C, “knew that Jews 
were executed by Sonderkommando 4a because they were Jews” when 
it convicted him of taking a consenting part in those executions.24 Simi-
larly, the Farben tribunal relied on the fact that Hermann Schmitz, the 
 
 21. United States v. Pohl, supra note 14, at 1002. 
 22. Id. at 1048. 
 23. Id. at 1002. 
 24. United States v. Ohlendorf (Einsatzgruppen), IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 577 (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office Oct. 1946–Apr. 1949).  
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Chairman of the company’s Vorstand, “knew of Farben’s program to 
take part in the spoliation of the French dyestuffs industry” to convict 
him of taking a consenting part in that spoliation.25  Importantly, there is 
no indication that the Einsatzgruppen, Farben, or Ministries tribunals 
would have applied a negligence standard to TCP—something that dis-
tinguishes TCP from command responsibility, because most of the 
NMTs held that negligence was sufficient for the latter.26 That distinc-
tion makes sense: because effective control over the perpetrators of the 
crime was not an essential element of TCP, it would have been mani-
festly unfair to convict a defendant for failing to object to a crime of 
which he was unaware. The defendant’s duty was to object to the crime, 
not to prevent it. 
B. Authority 
According to the tribunals, failing to object to a known crime qual-
ified as TCP only if the defendant had been in a position to influence 
the organization or the individuals responsible for its commission. In 
Einsatzgruppen, for example, Lothar Fendler, Deputy Chief of 
Einsatzgruppe C’s Sonderkommando 4b, was convicted for failing to 
object to executions because, “as the second highest ranking officer in 
the Kommando, his views could have been heard in complaint or protest 
against what he now says was a too summary procedure, but he chose to 
let the injustice go uncorrected.”27 Similarly, in Farben, Schmitz’s con-
viction depended on the fact that he failed to object to the company’s 
spoliation activities even though “[h]e was in a position to influence 
policy and effectively to alter the course of events.”28 By contrast, the 
Einsatzgruppen tribunal refused to convict Felix Ruehl, a low-level of-
ficer in Einsatzgruppe D, for taking a consenting part in 
Sonderkommando 10b’s executions because, although he knew about 
the executions, the prosecution had failed to prove “that he was in a po-
sition to control, prevent, or modify the severity of [the] program.”29 
TCP’s “authority” requirement, it is important to note, differs from 
command responsibility’s superior/subordinate requirement. None of 
the defendants convicted of taking a consenting part in a crime had ei-
ther de jure or de facto effective control over the individuals who com-
mitted it, which is what makes TCP a unique mode of participation. 
 
 25. United States v. Krauch, supra note 13, at 1155. 
 26. See HELLER, supra note 3, at 267–69.  
 27. United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note 24, at 572. 
 28. United States v. Krauch, supra note 13, at 1155. 
 29. United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note 24, at 580.  
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Schmitz might have been primus inter pares as the Chairman of Far-
ben’s Vorstand, but he did not have the power to approve or disapprove 
the activities of his colleagues. Fendler was an SD officer in Division III 
of Sonderkommando 4b, while the executions themselves were commit-
ted by units subordinate to the Gestapo officers in Division IV.30 Von 
Radetzky was in the same position in Sonderkommando 4a—and the 
Einsatzgruppen tribunal specifically declined to find that he had taken 
de facto control of Sonderkommando 4a when Paul Blobel, its regular 
commanding officer, was absent because of illness.31 Most revealing of 
all, however, is the Einsatzgruppen tribunal’s explanation of why it 
convicted Adolf Ott, the commanding officer of Sonderkommando 7b 
of Einsatzgruppe B, for executions committed by his unit: 
  In view of the fact that Ott arrived in Bryansk on 19 February 
for the specific purpose of taking over control of Sonderkommando 
7b, it is not clear why he should have waited until 15 March to as-
sume leadership of the unit. But even if this unexplained delay in the 
technical assumption of command were a fact, this would not of it-
self exculpate Ott from responsibility for the operation involved. 
Under Control Council Law No. 10 one may be convicted for taking 
a “consenting part in the perpetration of crimes” and it would be dif-
ficult to maintain that Ott, while actually with the Kommando, did 
not (even though technically not its commanding officer) consent to 
these executions.32 
This interpretation of the difference between TCP and command 
responsibility is confirmed by Judge Powers’ dissent in Ministries. 
Judge Powers derisively described TCP as convicting a defendant for 
“failure to either openly protest or go on a sit-down strike in time of 
war, after receiving knowledge that somebody somewhere in the gov-
ernment committed a crime.”33 That was a mischaracterization of TCP 
even as endorsed by Ministries itself: the majority had acquitted Ernst 
von Weizsaecker, the Foreign Office’s State Secretary, of taking a 
knowing and consenting part in Einsatzgruppen atrocities precisely be-
cause it concluded that “the Foreign Office had no jurisdiction or power 
to intervene” in the program.34 Judge Powers’ statement nevertheless in-
dicates that he did not view TCP as equivalent to command responsibil-
ity. Indeed, he insisted in the next paragraph of his dissent that he be-
 
 30. Id. at 571–72. 
 31. Id. at 577. 
 32. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
 33. United States v. von Weizsaecker, supra note 17, at 874–75 (Powers, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 472–73. 
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lieved that the two were synonymous: “[a]ny person who can order a 
crime committed can consent to its commission with equal effect and 
with equal responsibility. To take a consenting part means no more than 
that.”35 
C. Failure to Object 
If a defendant had knowledge of a crime and the authority to influ-
ence it, the tribunals agreed that he had a duty to use his authority to try 
to “control, prevent, or modify the severity” of the crime.36 It was the 
existence of that duty that justified holding the defendant responsible 
for an omission.37 Accordingly, Fendler was convicted because, as noted 
earlier, he did nothing even though “his views could have been heard in 
complaint or protest.”38 
IV. SHOULD WHAT IS LOST BE FOUND AGAIN? 
The NMT is the only tribunal that has ever viewed “taking a con-
senting part” as a mode of participation in an international crime. After 
Nuremberg, TCP disappeared into the dustbin of ICL history. For ex-
ample, the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind, which were drafted immediately after the NMT trials and 
specifically addressed modes of participation, criminalized everything 
in Article II(2) of Law No. 10 except TCP and membership in a crimi-
nal organization.39 
We know why membership in a criminal organization died at Nu-
remberg: it was widely viewed as inconsistent with the principle of cul-
pability, which—at least in its current form—requires an individualized 
connection between a defendant and specific crimes.40 Similar concerns 
about culpability likely led to the abandonment of TCP; the architects of 
modern ICL might simply have concluded that command responsibility 
represented the outer limits of omission-based criminal responsibility, 
making it unfair to convict a defendant of crimes committed by individ-
 
 35. Id. at 875 (Powers, J., dissenting) 
 36. United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note 24, at 580.  
 37. See, e.g., United States v. von Weizsaecker, supra note 17, at 625.  
 38. United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note 24, at 572; see also Pohl, supra note 14, at 1011; 
United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb (High Command), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 543–44 
(1950). 
 39. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with Commen-
taries (1954), reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 137, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. A/CN.6/SER.A/1954. 
 40. See, e.g., SHANE DARCY, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (Translational 2007).  
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uals not subject to his effective control “merely” because he was power-
ful enough to have objected to them. 
If that is the reason, the architects of modern ICL might have been 
too hasty—at least given the restrictive interpretation the NMTs gave to 
“taking a consenting part.” There is no question that TCP’s authority 
requirement is much more easily satisfied than command responsibil-
ity’s requirement of effective control. But the NMTs were aware of that 
fact and compensated for it in two ways: (1) by interpreting the authori-
ty requirement very narrowly, limiting it to high-ranking individuals 
whose protests would have been taken seriously within their organiza-
tion; and (2) by requiring knowledge that a crime had been or was going 
to be committed, in contrast to command responsibility’s negligence 
standard—the standard that still applies today, at least with regard to 
military commanders.41 On balance, therefore, TCP seems no less based 
on “personal guilt” than command responsibility. 
A strong normative case can also be made for TCP. As the authori-
ty requirement indicates, “taking a consenting part” does not purport to 
extend criminal responsibility to mere bystanders to criminal activity—
not even bystanders whose protests might well have prevented the crim-
inal act. The NMTs specifically limited TCP to powerful individuals in 
hierarchical organizations who were in a position to influence the ac-
tions of the less powerful—their subordinates in spiritu, if not actually 
de jure or de facto. It is not unreasonable, much less a violation of the 
principle of culpability, to suggest that such individuals should be held 
responsible for remaining silent in the face of crimes they know are go-
ing to be committed and might be able to stop. After all, the NMTs did 
not require the defendant to succeed in preventing the crimes in ques-
tion; he simply had to make reasonable efforts to do so. 
Finally, there is little question that TCP would be of great practical 
use for—if not the darling in the nursery of—international prosecutors. 
Recall the Hadžihasanović scenario at the beginning of this article. That 
scenario closely tracks the actions of Amir Kubura, the acting com-
mander of the Bosnian Army 3rd Corps, 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, 
whose soldiers committed a variety of international crimes two months 
before he became their (acting) commander.42 On interlocutory appeal, 
the Appeals Chamber struck the prosecution’s allegation that Kubura 
was responsible for failing to punish those crimes after assuming con-
 
 41. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, at 13 (“That military 
commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known 
that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes.”). 
 42. See Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, supra note 1, ¶ 38.  
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trol of the Brigade, holding by majority that “no practice can be found, 
nor is there any evidence of opinio juris that would sustain, the proposi-
tion that a commander can be held responsible for crimes committed by 
a subordinate prior to the commander’s assumption of command over 
that subordinate.”43 
The Appeals Chamber’s conclusion regarding customary interna-
tional law is almost certainly correct.44 Yet both judges and scholars 
have persuasively argued that Hadžihasanović has a deleterious practi-
cal effect on the enforcement of international humanitarian law.45 Here, 
for example, is Judge Schomburg in Orić: 
  Considering thus the purpose of superior responsibility, it is ar-
bitrary—and contrary to the spirit of international humanitarian 
law—to require for a superior’s individual criminal responsibility 
that the subordinate’s conduct took place only when he was placed 
under the superior’s effective control. Given the rapid succession of 
military commanders in armed conflicts, the result of such an inter-
pretation would be to grant impunity to those who committed war 
crimes under a predecessor. What is required of superiors is that they 
have to take the necessary and reasonable measures to initiate inves-
tigations and report any alleged violation of international humanitar-
ian law which comes to their knowledge, regardless of when it oc-
curred.46 
This problem might well have been avoided had “taking a consent-
ing part” been included in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.47 Kubura’s 
situation was not materially different than Adolf Ott’s: both were high-
ranking military commanders who failed to punish crimes that were 
committed not long before they assumed effective control over the per-
petrators. Kubura was clearly in a position where “his views could have 
been heard in complaint or protest,” yet—like Lothar Fendler, Ott’s col-
league—he “chose to let the injustice go uncorrected.” The only ques-
tion at trial would have been whether Kubura, like Ott and Fendler, had 
 
 43. Id. ¶ 45.  
 44. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, Command Responsibility and the Hadžihasanović 
Decision, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 598, 605 (2004). 
 45. See generally Joakim Dungel & Shannon Ghadiri, The Temporal Scope of Command 
Responsibility Revisited: Why Commanders Have a Duty to Prevent Crimes Committed After the 
Cessation of Effective Control, 17 U.C. DAVIS. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2010). 
 46. Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Schomburg, ¶ 17 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 3, 2008). 
 47. Stat. of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7(1), SC Res. 827, UN Doc. 
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise 
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 
of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.”). 
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actual knowledge of his new subordinates’ criminal activity. If Kubura 
had actual knowledge, he could have been convicted of taking a con-
senting part in those crimes, even if he was not responsible for them as a 
commander. 
 
